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CASES NOTED
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT
FEES AND OTHER REMUNERATIONS - SERVICE UNDER ASSIGNMENT BY
COURT - State v. Pruett, 10 Ohio App. 2d 218, 227 N.E.2d 261 (1967).
- Court-appointed counsel, representing an indigent defendant on appeal
from a first-degree murder conviction, submitted an application to the court
for attorney fees in an amount usually charged nonindigent clients. The ap-
pellate court held that the statutory provision (OHIO REV. CODE § 2941.51)
giving courts discretion to set compensation for court-appointed counsel in
murder cases was not intended to permit full compensation. The maximum
allowable compensation for an appeal in a first-degree murder case was set
at $2000.
The decision is analogous to the construction given to the Criminal Jus-
tice Act of 1964 by several federal district courts. Whether this and similar
decisions will ultimately be overturned to assure the indigent accused "effec-
tive" counsel will depend upon a future ruling by the United States Supreme
Court
SUSPENSION AND DISBARMENT - MISAPPROPRIATION AND FAILURE TO
ACCOUNT - Columbus Bar Association v. Edwards, 11 Ohio St. 2d 171,
228 N.E.2d 626 (1967). - Where an attorney misappropriated clients'
funds while mentally ill, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the absence
of any effort to make restitution, after his mental rehabilitation, justified the
Columbus Bar Association in suspending him from practice for an indefinite
period.
In so holding, the court affirmed the widely held principle that disci-
plinary proceedings are civil in nature, and are for the protection of the
public rather than the punishment of the attorney. Although mental incom-
petence is usually a defense in such a proceeding, and limits the suspension
to the period of the mental illness, the court distinguished the instant case
because rehabilitation had been psychiatrically certified, and the attorney
still failed to adhere to the Canons of Professional Ethics.
AUTOMOBILES
CONTROL, REGULATION, AND USE - CERTIFICATE OF TITLE - Hardware
Mutual Casualty Co. v. Gall, 11 Ohio App. 2d 217 (1967). - Plaintiff, an
insurance company, obtained a certificate of title from the owner of a stolen
car. Four months later defendant innocently purchased .the stolen car from
an Ohio automobile dealer. Because the metal plates carrying the car's serial
number had been altered, the certificate of title issued to defendant carried
an incorrect serial number. In granting plaintiffs action of replevin, and
disregarding decisions protecting bona fide purchasers, the court ruled that
defendant's false certificate of title with an altered serial number could not
prevail over the owner's true certificate carrying the correct number. Rec-
ognition of defendant's false certificate, the court reasoned, would encourage
traffic in stolen automobiles.
The dissent, relying on an earlier Ohio Supreme Court ruling to the
effect that one cannot prevail in an action of replevin against an innocent
purchaser of a motor vehicle who acquired possession in Ohio with an osten-
sibly valid Ohio certificate of tide, reasoned that defendant's certificate of
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title appeared valid and corresponded with the serial numbers on the car and
other identifying nomenclatures, and therefore, defendant should have been
accorded bona fide purchaser protection.
INJURIES FROM OPERATION - PERSONS OTHER THAN OWNERS OR OP-
ERATORS - Fuller v. Standard Stations, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 792 (Ct. App.
1967). - The plaintiff, a minor, appealed from a judgment sustaining the
general demurrer of service station operators who sold gasoline to a recog-
nizably intoxicated driver, thereby supplying him with the motive power
with which he subsequently caused the deaths of the appellant's immediate
family in an ensuing accident. The court held that the gasoline vendors
were exempt from liability as a matter of law, reasoning that because tavern-
keepers who supply tortfeasors with liquor are exempt from liability to third
persons in California, so too must be service station operators whose com-
modity is more remote from causation than alcohol.
Although the court was reluctant to adhere to stare decisis and noted
with favor other states' progress in the area, the decision carries California
law in this area even farther across the grain of modern tort doctrine than
previously.
RIDING WITH RECKLESS, INEXPERIENCED, OR INTOXICATED OPERATOR
- ASSUMPTION OF RISK - Chalmers v. Willis, 231 A.2d 70 (Md. Ct.
App. 1967). - Plaintiff volunteered to instruct defendant in the operation
of a motor vehicle. During the second lesson defendant failed to negotiate
a left turn and struck a telephone pole causing plaintiff's injuries. The trialjudge ruled in defendant's favor n. o. v. holding that plaintiff, as a matter
of law, was not entitled to recover because she had assumed the risk of the
learner's negligence. The appellate court reversed and held that the assump-
tion of risk by a licensed operator for a learner's negligence is a question of
fact which a jury must determine.
State courts that have encountered this problem are divided on its solu-
tion. New York and Kentucky hold that, as a matter of law, an experienced
operator who accompanies a learner assumes the risk of the learner's negli-
gence. However, Massachusetts, South Dakota, California, Louisiana, and
Pennsylvania adhere to the rule announced by the Maryland court.
BANKRUPTCY
ATTORNEY'S FEES - REASONABLENESS - Jacobowitz v. Double Seven
Corp., 378 F.2d 405 (9th Cir. 1967). - Appellant, trustee's attorney in
bankruptcy, requested a fee based upon the recommended minimum fee
schedule of his local bar association. The referee's order reducing the re-
quested fee was affirmed by the district court. Although expert witnesses
testified without contradiction that the fee requested was reasonable, the
referee held the Bankruptcy Act to demand that attorneys in bankruptcy re-
ceive an appreciably smaller amount than they could command in purely
private practice. On appeal, held, reversed. A legal determination of rea-
sonable attorney's fees in bankruptcy cases is no different from a similar
determination in private employment except that a court should, in fixing
fees, be predisposed to moderation.
The dissent, while stressing the necessity of preserving the res of bank-
ruptcy proceedings, indicated that reviewing courts traditionally deferred to
the lower court's discretion. The fact that the majority chose not to con-
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sider the referee's exercise of discretion suggests a departure from the earlier
rule announced in In re Owl Drug Co., 16 F. Supp. 139, 144 (D. Nev.
1936).
RELIEF OF DEBTORS - WAGE EARNERS' PLANS - lIo re Bradford, 268 F.
Supp. 896 (N.D. Ala. 1967). - A retired worker, whose only sources of
income were social security and a state pension, filed a plan under Ch. XIII
of the Bankruptcy Act of 1964 whereby he proposed to pay his debts
through a period of extension. A creditor objected, alleging that the debtor
was not a "wage earner" as defined by -the Act, and therefore, not entitled
to relief under Ch. XIII. The court, in affirming the decision of the referee,
held that a person whose only source of income is social security is a "wage
earner" as defined in Ch. XIII, and is entitled to relief under that section of
the Act.
By including social security beneficiaries, the court has greatly expanded
the Ch. XIII definition of wage earner. This is consistent with the legisla-
tive history of Ch. XIII, which shows an intent to make the wage earners'
plan available to as many of the working class as possible.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
EQUAL PROTECTION OF I.AWS - POLICE Pow1ER - Farrell v. Drew, 19
N.Y.2d 486, 227 N.E.2d 824, 281 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1967). - In a summary
eviction proceeding brought against the defendant for nonpayment of rent,
the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of N.Y. Soc. WELFARE LAW
§ 143-b, which provides a rent abatement for welfare recipients who live
in buildings which contain a "violation of law... which is dangerous, haz-
ardous or detrimental to life or health." The trial court found that the door
to the apartment of a nonwelfare tenant, required by statute to be "self-
closing," was not properly functioning, and constituted a hazardous condition
that rendered the building unsafe for all tenants because of the possibility
of fire originating there. Affirming the decision of the trial court in the
defendant's favor, the court, on appeal, held that the remedy of a rent abate-
ment did not deny the plaintiff equal protection of the laws, deprive him
of property without due process of law, or unconstitutionally impair con-
tractual obligations.
In accord with previous decisions construing this Act, the court reasoned
that "such legislation is not unconstitutional as long as a 'reasonable basis'
exists for differentiating among members of the same class" The court
conceded that landlords of welfare recipients are not the only ones who vio-
late the building codes, but noted that landlords of welfare tenants have
been "conspicuous offenders."
EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAws - RACIAL DISCRIMINATION - Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). - Petitioners, a white man and a Negro,
woman, both residents of Virginia, were married in the District of Colum-
bia. After their return to Virginia, they were convicted of violating Vir-
ginia's ban on interracial marriages. The State contended that because its.
antimiscegenation laws punished white and Negro alike, its racial classifica-
tion was not discriminatory. Rejecting this contention, the Supreme Court
said all classifications based upon race constitute invidious racial discrim-
ination in violation of the 14th amendment, unless some legitimate,
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independent, and overriding state purpose justifies it. The Court found no
such purpose.
Virginia had been one of 16 states still prohibiting interracial marriages.
Within the last 15 years, 14 states have lifted antimiscegenation laws. By
holding Virginia's statutory scheme in violation of the equal protection and
due process clauses of the 14th amendment, the Court has sounded the
death knell of the states' antimiscegenation statutes.
JUDICIAL POWER - POLITICAL QUESTIONS - Powell v. McCormack, 266
F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1967). - An action was brought by Congressman
Adam Clayton Powell against the officers and members of the United States
House of Representatives for an injunction, declaratory judgment, and man-
damus enjoining the enforcement of House Resolution No. 278 excluding
Powell from Congress. The complaint alleged that the resolution violated
the Congressman's constitutional rights because it was based on racial dis-
crimination, violated procedural due process, and constituted cruel and un-
usual punishment, an ex post facto law, and a bill of attainder. Powell also
petitioned for a three-judge panel to hear the case.
The court denied the request for a three-judge panel stating that a reso-
lution is not an act of Congress under 28 U.S.C. § 2282 (1964), and there-
fore a three-judge panel is not necessary. The court noted that the contro-
versy in question was political and held that under the doctrine of separation
of powers, the district court did not have jurisdiction to hear the complaint.
The right of Congress to punish its members remains, and it appears that
the courts should not question or interfere with this right.
CONTRACrS
ACTIONS FOR BREACH - CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACT - Canney v.
New England Telephone & Telegraph Co., 228 N.E.2d 723 (Mass. 1967).
- Plaintiff, while employed as an installer and repairman for defendant
company, fell from a telephone pole and received permanent injuries to his
spine. On the day of the accident, July 7, 1945, company representatives
visited the plaintiff and assured him that if he did not sue the company, he
would receive full pay as an installer and repairman as long as he lived. The
plaintiff agreed, but no written contract was signed or offered. On July 25,
1945, the plaintiff signed defendant's "disability plan," which provided for
13 weeks full pay, and one-half pay for the duration of his disability. Even-
tually, the plaintiff returned to work, where he served in routine functions
at the higher rate of an installer and repairman, until his release from the
company in 1959. In reversing the decree of the lower court, the supreme
judicial court held that the defendant was not bound by the oral promises
of July 7th, but rather by the provisions of the signed agreement.
Although the evidence indicated that the company recognized the earlier
promises and paid the plaintiff higher wages for many years, the court ap-
plied the rule that an oral agreement is superseded and merged into a written
contract, and, therefore, the defendant could not be held to the oral promises.
COUNTIES
COUNTY EXPENSES, CHARGES, AND STATUTORY I/ABILITIES - CRIMUNAL
PROCEEDINGS - Abodeely v. County of WYorcester, 227 NE.2d 486 (Mass.
1967). - Plaintiff, an attorney appointed by a judge to represent an in-
digent criminal defendant, rendered services until the defendant decided to
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plead guilty to lesser charges. Plaintiff then submitted a bill for services
rendered to the presiding judge who approved the bill and submitted it to
the county treasurer who refused payment.
Contrary to the great weight of authority, the court held that the state
statute requiring counties to absorb the costs of criminal prosecution should
also be extended to cover the costs of defense. The court reasoned that it
is inequitable for a few attorneys, skilled in criminal prosecution and de-
fenses, to alone bear the burden of representing indigent defendants when
this responsibility is properly that of all the bar, and, indeed, of the entire
community.
COURTS
EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION - DOMICILE OR RESIDENCE OF PARTY -
Foye v. Consolidated Bailing Machine Co., 229 A.2d 196 (Me. 1967). -
Plaintiff brought an action for personal injury alleged to have been sustained
as a result of a defective and dangerous paper press. The defendant-vendor,
a New York company, was not the manufacturer of the press. On orders
from the purchaser, a Massachusetts company, the defendant shipped the
press directly to plaintiffs employer in Maine. Jurisdiction was based on
this single transaction under ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, 5 704(1).
In denying defendant's motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds, the
court held that the direct shipment of the dangerous press into the state con-
stituted a tortious act committed "within the state," under the statute. Con-
sidering the convenience of the forum to the parties, and the nature of the
activity of the defendant, the court concluded that the single transaction in
this case was enough to confer jurisdiction without violating the require-
ments of due process. The court has thus assumed the maximum possiblejurisdiction over nonresident parties in civil actions.
OmO's LONG-AEm STATUTE - TRANSACrING OF BUSINESS - American
Compressed Steel Corp. v. Pettibone Malliken Corp., 11 Ohio Misc. 1 (S.D.
Ohio 1967). - Defendant, a foreign manufacturer of custom-designed ma-
chinery, had on two occasions come to Ohio to negotiate a sale. Plaintiff
signed the agreement in Ohio while defendant executed the contract in
Iowa. Subsequently, defendant returned to Ohio to deliver drawings of the
proposed machine. In an action for damages for breach of contract, the
federal district court held that defendant had "minimal contacts" with Ohio
and that the maintenance of an action would not violate the due process
guarantees of the 14th amendment. Ohio's long-arm statute was held to
contemplate defendant's activities.
Carefully defining defendant's post-contract excursion to Ohio as the
transacting of "business," the court rested its decision upon Liquid Carriers
Corp. v. American Marine Corp., 375 F.2d 951 (2d Cir. 1967), in which
substantial preliminary negotiations alone constituted a transaction of busi-
ness and were sufficient to bring the defendant within the jurisdiction of
New York courts.
CRIMNAL LAW
ADMISSIONS, DECLARATIONS, AND HEARSAY - PROOF AND EFFECT -
State v . Gresham, 10 Ohio App. 2d 199, 227 N.E.2d 248 (1967). - In a
trial which came after the Escobedo case but before the Miranda case, de-
fendant was convicted of second-degree murder. After the defendant had
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been taken into custody and to the police station, he was questioned by de-
tectives and made certain admissions. Defendant had not requested counsel.
The court of appeals held that the trial court had committed prejudicial
error in permitting the prosecution to use these admissions against the de-
fendant on direct examination of the interrogating detectives without prov-
ing that the defendant had been warned of his constitutional right to remain
silent and that he had waived this right.
This decision dearly establishes that the prosecution has the burden of
proving that the accused was warned of his constitutional right to remain
silent and be assisted by counsel, and that the accused waived this right; and
further, that the defense need only make, at most, a general objection to the
admission of statements made by defendant.
CO-DEFENDANTS - NUMBER OF COUNSEL - People v. Kessee, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 780 (Ct. App. 1967). - Appellant and one McLeod, together repre-
sented by one attorney, were jointly tried for robbery. The facts indicated
that McLeod's role was purely a passive one, but that the appellant wielded
a chain. During argument, defense counsel, in an effort to help McLeod,
disparaged appellant by saying, "the case that is made out, if any is made
out, is to Kessee, not as to McLeod." An appeal was taken from the ver-
dict of guilty. The court of appeals reversed the conviction, holding that
appellant had a constitutional right to separate counsel because the facts
indicated a heavier involvement by one Aefendanr than the other.
The immediate decision will only apply in rare instances where the
criminal involvement of the two parties varies substantially in degree, and
where an effective defense cannot be made on behalf of one defendant with-
out prejudicing the other. The decision also rejects the general rule that
a defendant cannot appeal if he does not complain that his counsel is inade-
quately representing him at the trial level.
EVIDENCE - CHILDREN'S CONFESSIONS - State v. Francois, 197 So. 2d 492(Fla. 1967). - Defendants, two 16-year-old boys, were tried and found
guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. Signed
confessions were introduced as evidence over the protest of counsel. The
confessions had been obtained after advising the defendants of their rights,
but while they were under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. The Flor-
ida Supreme Court, in upholding the trial court's decision, held that a
minor's confession freely given with notice of constitutional rights is admis-
sible as evidence regardless of the juvenile court jurisdiction factor.
The Florida Supreme Court adopts the majority position that in spite ofjuvenile jurisdiction, a minor's confession is subject to the same tests for
admissibility as that of an adult, as long as it can be shown that the minor
was mentally capable of understanding the significance of his actions.
FAILURE OF ACCUSED TO TESTIFY - NECESSITY AND PROPRIETY OF IN-
STRUCTIONS - State v. Wallace, 152 N.W.2d 266 (Iowa 1967). - De-
fendant was convicted of shoplifting. During the trial defendant refrained
from testifying in her own behalf. The trial judge gave an instruction to
the jury to the effect that defendant was not required to take the stand and
that no inference of guilt was to be drawn from this failure. Defendant
neither requested nor objected to this instruction. On appeal, however,
defendant claims error in that the instruction violated her fifth amendment
right against self-incrimination.
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The Supreme Court of Iowa, in a case of first impression, adopted the
federal court position that such an instruction, even though not requested by
defendant, could not adversely prejudice the jury by drawing attention to
defendant's failure to testify. The court, although it felt that such an in-
struction would even tend to be beneficial to the defendant's case, did admit
that it would have been better practice if the trial judge had not given an
instruction on this issue.
INDIGENT CLIENT - COMPENSATION FOR COUNSEL - Henderson vz.
State, 11 Ohio App. 2d 1, 277 N.E.2d 814 (1967). - Defendant, tried
and convicted of a felony, petitioned the court for post-conviction relief and
for compensation for counsel under OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2953.21, 2953.24.
The trial court summarily dismissed the petition. The court of appeals, con-
sidering only the question of whether the indigent petitioner had the right
to compensation for counsel to prosecute an appeal pursuant to § 2953.24,
affirmed on the ground that the petition did not state facts which would
entitle the petitioner to relief.
But; by interpreting the statutes to mean that an indigent petitioner is
entitled to compensation for counsel in post-conviction relief if the trial
judge feels that the petition alleges facts which, if proved, would entitle the
petitioner to such relief, and that if files and records of the case do not
negate these facts, the court places Ohio in a minority of states which allow
compensation for counsel in post-conviction proceedings.
POST-CONVIciON RELIEF - NECESSITY FOR SANITY HEARING - People
v. Pridgen, 37 IlL 2d 295, 226 N.E.2d 598 (1967). - In 1959 Charles
Pridgen was convicted of burglary. He later petitioned for a sanity hearing
under the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act. The Supreme Court of
Illinois affirmed the trial court's judgment dismissing the petition and held
that a bona fide doubt about defendant's sanity at the time he was tried for
burglary was not raised by his statement that, at the time of trial, because
of a recent gunshot wound in the head, he had been unable to recall any of
the events surrounding the alleged burglary, or, by his counsel's statement
that the defendant had been unable to give him any -information that might
help in the preparation of a defense.
This case affirms 'the result in People v. Lego, 32 IMI. 2d 76, 203 N.E.2d
875 (1965), where a self-serving note by the defendant which stated, "I
feel I am not competent to stand trial due to the fact that I suffer from
black-out spells," was not sufficient to create a bona fide doubt as to the
defendant's sanity. The court in the instant case found it unnecessary to
consider the contention that amnesia is a form of insanity within the mean-
ing of the law. However, it is still dear that the defendant is entitled to a
sanity hearing on the issue of his competency to stand trial if facts have
been presented to the court which raise a bona fide doubt of the defendant's
sanity.
DEATH
ACTIONS FOR CAUSING DEATH - DAMAGES, FORFEITURE, OR FINE -
Lockhart v. Besel, 71 Wash. 109, 426 P.2d 605 (1967). - Appellant,
whose minor son was killed when his motorcycle was struck by an automo-
bile, initiated a wrongful death action against the driver and the driver's
parents. The trial court refused to instruct the jury to grant compensation
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for loss of companionship. On appeal, the supreme court reversed the trial
court's decision and held that loss of companionship should be considered
in computing damages in an action for the wrongful death of a minor child.
This decision signals a change of view by Washington courts toward the
validity of lost companionship as a measure of damages. All previous cases
that had denied damages for lost companionship were expressly overruled.
Although only a slim majority of states take this position, the recent activity
of courts and legislatures throughout the country hallmarks the trend toward
allowing consideration of lost companionship in a suit for wrongful death.
ACTIONS FOR CAUSING DEATH - WHAT LAW GOVERNS - Thomas v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 281 N.Y.S.2d 495 (Sup. Ct. 1967). - In a wrong-
ful death action arising out of an airplane crash in the navigable waters of
Illinois, defendants claimed that the Illinois law should be followed under
maritime law. The trip originated in New York and New York citizens
were involved. The court held that under its choice-of-law rule, the action
is properly brought under New York law, and maritime law is not ap-
plicable.
New York holds that the local law of the state which has the most sig-
nificant relationship with the occurrence and parties concerned prevails.
The common law traditionally has held that the law of the situs of the
wrong should apply. Federal maritime law had previously applied to such
cases, but since Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959) the Supreme
Court has held -that the applicable state statute applies. This decision fol-
lows the Tungus case and the choice-of-law rule of New York.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
MANDAMUS - COPYRIGHTS - Public Affairs Associates v. Rickover, 268
F. Supp. 444 (D.D.C. 1967). - Plaintiff, a publisher, desired to quote
from or publish two of defendant's speeches. Defendant's publisher in-
formed plaintiff that these speeches were protected by copyright and that
suit would be brought to protect defendant's legal rights if the copyright
was not observed. Plaintiff instituted an action for declaratory judgment
contending that the speeches resulted from defendant's official duties, were
partially prepared on government time and with government facilities, and
were in the public domain. Defendant stated that the two speeches were
not within the context of his official duties and that it was his legal right
to protect his proprietary interest in the speeches by copyright. The court
held that the writing and the delivery of the two speeches formed no part
of the defendant's official duties and that the speeches were the defendant's
private property which he was entitled to copyright.
The court restated the standards to be applied in determining the pro-
prietary rights of a speech by a government official The test is whether
the speeches were written and delivered as a part of the defendant's official
duties. Because of the difficulty in determining what the exact duties of a
high government official are, the court will examine the preparation and
delivery of a speech and the speech itself as aids in determining whether
a government official was acting in his public or private capacity.
PARTIES - INTEREST IN SUBJECT MATTER - Protestants and Other Amer-
icans United for Separation of Church and State v. United States, 266 F.
Supp. 473 (S.D. Ohio 1967). - Plaintiffs, contending that the Elementary
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and Secondary Education Act of 1965 is unconstitutional, brought an action
for declaratory judgment, injunction, and damages. The court sustained the
defendant's motion to dismiss on the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked the
requisite standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Act because of
plaintiffs' failure to allege an immediate and direct infringement of their
religious freedom under the first amendment.
The court considered controlling Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447
(1923) which stated that the mere fact that funds are being expended in
an unconstitutional manner and such expenditures deplete the federal treas-
ury to the ultimate detriment of the individual plaintiffs and all other per-
sons similarly situated is insufficient to establish standing to challenge the
constitutionality of the Act. Consequently, the Frothingham standard, al-
though frequently challenged, is still the rule in federal courts.
HUSBAND AND WIFE
TORTS - PERSONAL INJURIES TO HUSBAND - Moran v. Quality Alumi-
num Casting Co., 34 Wis. 2d 542, 150 N.W.2d 137 (1967). - Plaintiff
was injured by an electric shock from a power line. The circuit court found
in favor of his cause of action for personal injuries, but sustained the de-
murrer to his wife's joined cause of action for her "loss of consortium and
society and companionship." On appeal the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
reversed the ruling on the demurrer and held that a wife may maintain an
action for loss of consortium against a negligent tortfeasor provided that her
cause of action is joined with the action of her husband.
This case reverses the holding in Nickel v. Hardware Mutual Casualty
Co., 269 Wis. 647, 70 N.W.2d 205 (1955), and brings Wisconsin into the
growing number of states that recognize that a wife's interest in the undis-
turbed relation with her consort is as worthy of legal protection as the hus-
band's similar interest. The court solved the problem of double recovery
by requiring the wife's cause of action to be joined in her husband's suit
for injuries.
TORTS - PERSONAL INJURIES TO HUSBAND - Umpleby v. Dorsey, 10
Ohio Misc. 288 (C.P. 1967). - The plaintiff, a married woman, sought
recovery for loss of the consortium of her negligently injured husband. The
court, observing the 14th amendment due process and equal protec-
tion clauses, and noting the incongruity in sustaining recovery in such cases
to the husband and denying same to the wife, held that a wife is entitled to
recover for loss of consortium.
The established Ohio rule states that the wife may not recover for the
loss of the consortium of her husband based on negligent injury to her hus-
band. This rule is supported by the common law and the majority of states.
The federal courts, however, since 1950, have afforded the wife recovery in
such cases. The decision of the court, if sustained on appeal, would change
the law in Ohio.
INTERNAL REvEN uE
SALARIES AND WAGES - BusiNess EXPENsES - Disney v. United States,
267 F. Supp. I (C.D. Cal. 1967). - In this action, Roy 0. Disney, presi-
dent of Walt Disney Productions, and his wife sought to recover money and
interest claimed to be overpayments of income taxes. The sums claimed
were taxes levied on money paid to Mr. Disney to reimburse him for money
19671
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:175
spent by his wife when she accompanied him on numerous business trips.
Mr. Disney claimed these travel deductions were valid since his wife assisted
him in his business activities on these trips.
The court found that because of the taxpayer's unique position as head
of Disney Productions, he was entitled to these deductions for his wife's
expenses. The court recognized that the directors of Walt Disney Produc-
tions thought that in order to promote the "family image" of the corporation,
the wives of the executives should accompany their husbands on business
trips. On the trips in question, Mrs. Disney entertained customers and
generally added to the social aspects of the trips. Consequently, these ex-
penses were for a valid business purpose, and therefore deductible. The
decision reflects the established attitude toward extraordinary business ex-
penses - that each case will be decided on its own peculiar facts within the
"valid business purpose" framework.
LABOR RELATIONS
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS - MATTERS SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION -
Butchers' Union Local 229 v. Cudahy Packing Co., 59 Cal. Rptr. 713
(1967). - Pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, appellant peti-
tioned for an order to compel appellee, who was engaged in interstate
commerce, to arbitrate a pension eligibility grievance and to appoint an
arbitrator. Appellant contended that the dispute, which involved the age
qualification of a member, came within the ambit of the agreement, thus
permitting arbitration. The trial court, in rejecting appellant's argument,
ruled that the pension agreement was collateral to the collective bargaining
agreement and not a matter for arbitration.
The California Supreme Court, in reversing, held that the trial court
erred in failing to apply the required federal standard which commands arbi-
tration unless after resolving all doubts in favor of arbitration it can, with
positive assurance, determine that the dispute is not covered by the arbitra-
tion agreement. The dissenting opinion accepted the logic of the trial court.
LICENSES
OCCUPATIONS AND PRIVILEGES - VALIDITY OF AcTs AND ORDINANcES
- City of Bowling Green v. Lodico, 11 Ohio St. 2d 135, 228 N.E.2d 325
(1967). -Appellant, while promoting the candidate of the Socialist
Workers Party for President of the United States, was convicted of selling
pamphlets in violation of a city ordinance which required the obtaining of
a solicitor's license. The ordinance granted complete discretion to the li-
censing official to determine the solicitor's moral character and whether the
enterprise involved was lawful. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the
conviction and declared the ordinance violative of the constitutional guaran-
tees of freedom of the press, reasoning that because the publication was
wholly political, the charge of 25 cents per copy did not render the distribu-
tion a "commercial" venture not subject to the guarantees of free speech and
press.
The decision is another step in the effort to define the boundaries of
freedom of the press. While recognizing that freedom of the press is sub-
ject to reasonable police restraint to protect equally the right of privacy, the
court condemns the practice of censorship in the form of strict ordinances
which reserve to the grantors of the licenses the sole discretion of deter-
mining who shall receive them.
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MASTER AND SERVANT
MASTER'S LIABILITY FOR INJURIES TO SERVANT - CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE OF SERVANT - Alber v. Owens, 59 Cal. Rptr. 117 (1967). -
Plaintiff, a subcontractor, sued the owner and general contractor for personal
injuries sustained in a 'fall at a construction site. California Workman's
Compensation statutes impose a high standard of care on employers to pro-
vide a safe place to work. Although the trial court found that the condition
of the balcony from which plaintiff fell was negligence per se under the
statutes, the court, persuaded by the argument that plaintiff's employer status
required that his conduct be judged by the same rigorous standards, held
that plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law, and entered
a nonsuit
The Supreme Court of California, realizing that the lower court's deci-
sion would establish a rule of concurrent obligation and insulate all em-
ployers from liability to any employee except one bearing no responsibility
whatsoever for direction or control, reversed. Taking a pragmatic approach
to both job safety and compensation for injury, the supreme court observed
that the general contractor is in a better position to supervise and provide
for needed safety requirements. The decision continues the trend limiting
the class of persons deemed "masters" for tort liability purposes.
MuNICPAL CORPORATIONS
DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY - FAILURE TO PROTECT AGAINST FIRE -
Veach v. City of Phoenix, 427 P.2d 335 (Ariz. 1967). - Appellant, seek-
ing damages, alleged that, as a municipal corporation, appellee had an obli-
gation to supply water for the fire protection of appellant's property and
that appellee failed to supply such water despite appellant's request for the
installation of a fire hydrant In dismissing appellant's complaint, the trial
court ruled that appellee had no duty to supply such water.
The Arizona Supreme Court reversed and held that although a munici-
pality has no absolute duty to provide water for fire protection purposes,
once it has assumed the responsibility of furnishing fire protection, it then
has the burden of providing its inhabitants with such reasonable protection
as others within a similar area are accorded. Since a municipality exercises
discretion in determining what is reasonable protection, when such discre-
tion is challenged as to its reasonableness, it is a question for the jury to
decide. The decision affords a substantial inlet through the characteristic
wall of immunity that prevails in most jurisdictions.
NEGLIGENCE
STORE OWNERS - FAILURE TO REMOVE ICE AND SNOW - Debie v'. Coch-
ran Pharmacy-Berwick, Inc., 11 Ohio St. 2d 38, 227 NXE.2d 603 (1967).-
Plaintiff, a customer in the store of the defendant, slipped and fell on an
ice and snow covered sidewalk adjacent to the premises. Plaintiff contended
that defendant either knew of the slippery and hazardous condition of the
sidewalk or, by -the exercise of due care, should have known of the danger.
The supreme court held that where the owner or occupier of business
premises is not shown to have had notice, actual or implied, that the natural
accumulation of snow and ice on his premises had created a condition sub-
stantially more dangerous to his business invitees than they would have
anticipated by reason of their knowledge of conditions prevailing generally
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in the area, there is a failure of proof of actionable negligence. The posi-
tion taken by the court is consonant with the established Ohio rule.
PAYMENT
REQUISITES AND SUFFICIENCY - PAYMENT BY CHECK - Bass v. Olson,
378 F.2d 818 (9th Cit. 1967).- Respondent, an attorney, sought payment
of his fee under section 60(d) of the Bankruptcy Act for legal services ren-
dered to a company-dient just prior to filing for bankruptcy. Within 3
months he received a check from a third party made payable to the company
and claimed it as payment of his fee pursuant to an agreement with the
company's president. The receiver challenged the claim but agreed to de-
posit the check in a joint account pending final judicial settlement. Al-
though subsequently the receiver relinquished his claim, the trustee in bank-
ruptcy asserted a claim over the money. The referee denied the claim of
the attorney, but was overruled by the district court.
In reversing the district court's decision, the court of appeals applied the
governing California law of payments made by check for payments of attor-
ney's fees under the Bankruptcy Act. The record showed that the check
was cashed on behalf of the company and for the benefit of the company.
The court ruled that the check would not be considered payment under the
prevailing law until it had been cashed on behalf of the person claiming it
as payment, and money once deposited must be held for the benefit of the
one claiming it as payment in order for it to constitute payment.
SALES
MODIFICATION OR RECISSION OF CONTRACT BY BUYER - DEFENSES OR
OBJECTIONS - Wilson v,. Scanpoli, 228 A.2d 848 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967).
- Plaintiff, purchaser of a new color television from defendant, com-
plained that the set did not function properly. Defendant promised
to repair the set or to replace it if repair was impossible. Plaintiff refused
to permit defendant to remove the chassis and demanded a new set. Plain-
tiff brought an action to recover the purchase price. The appellate court,
reversing the trial court, held that where the buyer rejects a nonconforming
tender, which the seller had reasonable grounds to believe would be accept-
able, the seller will be given a reasonable time to cure any minor defects; if
this is impossible, or if the defects are of a major proportion, the seller must
substitute conforming tender.
Case law substantiates this initial interpretation of the UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE 5 2-508. Prior to the adoption of the Uniform Commercial
Code, the majority of the states held that minor repairs or reasonable adjust-
ments are methods through which a seller may perfect tender. It is impor-
tant to note, however, that if the seller's efforts to perfect tender by minor
repairs or adjustments are unsatisfactory, or if they cause the buyer an un-
reasonable inconvenience, the buyer will then be justified in demanding
substitute tender. The importance of this decision is that it may serve as
a guide to other states in interpreting UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
2-508.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER
RIGHTS AND LIABILIT1ES OF PARTIES - POSSESSION UNDER UNRECORDED
INSTRUMENTS - Engel v. Tinker National Bank, 269 F. Supp. 199
CASES NOTED
(E.D.N.Y. 1967). - Petitioners, contract vendees, and one of the defend-
ants, the contract vendor, executed an unrecorded, conditional sales contract.
The contract provided for the right to accelerated payments. Petitioners
took immediate possession. Increasingly beset by creditors, the contract
vendor assigned her contract and executed a quit claim deed to the Tinker
National Bank. When petitioners attempted to exercise their option of
accelerated payments, the bank refused to convey a deed saying it held the
deed solely as collateral security. The court held the equitable interest of a
contract vendee in possession took priority over the docketed judgment and
tax lien interests of subsequent purchasers (defendants) without knowledge,
even in the absence of recording.
In its decision the court adhered to the law of New York and the ma-jority view by favoring the protection of the contract vendee in possession
from docketed judgments. The true significance of the decision lies in the
priority given to the equitable interest of a contract vendee in possession
under an unrecorded, conditional sales contract over government tax liens.
Before the Federal Tax Lien Act tax liens were entitled to priority. How-
ever, as this decision indicates, the Act makes dear that a purchaser who has
not taken tide to, or fully paid for, property is protected as if he were a
purchaser with tide.
ZONING
VARIANCES OR -XCEPTIONS - GROUNDS FOR GRANT OR DENIAL -
Broadway, Laguna, Vallejo Association v. Board of Permit Appeals, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 146 (1967). - Plaintiffs sought writ of mandate to order the Board
of Permit Appeals to reverse its decision in granting a variance from floor-
area ratio requirements to a developer. The variance was granted upon the
developer's showing that unusual subsoil conditions had created exceptional
circumstances which made a complying structure less profitable than antici-
pated and that literal enforcement of the zoning regulations would cause an
unnecessary hardship.
In its reversal, the California Supreme Court held that the Board ex-
ceeded its statutory authority in granting a variance. San Francisco's mu-
nicipal planning code outlines five requisites that must be met before a
variance can be granted, and evidence of difficulties due to subsoil con-
ditions and a lower profit margin were legally irrelevant to meeting the
requirements. San Francisco's legislative scheme, by providing concrete
standards that can be tested on review, provides a method of defining ad-ministrative discretion.
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